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Amartya Sen’s The Idea of Justice is a very rich book, with many aspects worth discussing. I 
will limit myself here to one major claim that Sen makes, namely that transcendental theories of 
justice are redundant. I will argue that this ‘Redundancy Claim’ is mistaken, since for justice-
enhancing actions we need both transcendental and non-transcendental theorising of justice. 
Nevertheless I endorse an implication of the Redundancy Claim, namely that theorists of justice 
should shift their focus from transcendental theorizing towards thinking about justice-
enhancing change, thereby restoring the balance between transcendental and non-transcendental 
theorizing. I will argue that this ‘Rebalancing Claim’ not only follows from the (mistaken) 
Redundancy Claim, but also from another argument which Sen advances about the current 
practice of philosophers of justice. I will conclude that the Redundancy Claim has to be 
rejected, but that this is not a big loss, since what is really important is the Rebalancing Claim, 
which is vindicated. 
 
Transcendental theories and the Redundancy Claim 
How does Sen understand transcendental theories of justice? Transcendental theories of justice 
are theories that describe a perfectly just situation: no further justice-improvements are 
possible. Transcendental theory  
“concentrates its attention on what it identifies as perfect justice, rather than on relative 
comparisons of justice and injustice. It tries only to identify social characteristics that cannot be 
transcended in terms of justice, and its focus is thus not on comparing feasible societies, all of 
which may fall short of the ideals of perfection. The inquiry is aimed at identifying the nature of 
‘the just’, rather than finding some criteria for an alternative being ‘less unjust’ than another.” (p. 
5-6).  
Sen argues that transcendental theories are redundant if our aim is to actually make choices that 
advance justice: “If a theory of justice is to guide reasoned choice of policies, strategies or 
institutions, then the identification of fully just social arrangements is neither necessary nor 
sufficient” (p. 15). Call this the Redundancy Claim. I agree with one part of the Redundancy 
Claim, namely that transcendental theory is not sufficient for guidance, and will therefore only 
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focus on the claim that it is not necessary. This latter part of the Redundancy Claim I believe to 
be mistaken.  
Sen argues that a number of basic injustices don’t need transcendental theory in order 
for us to understand and agree that they concern gross injustices (xi-xii). Indeed, all theories of 
justice would agree that corruption in politics, power abuse by economic actors, or the training 
of child soldiers are blatant cases of injustice, and that we don’t need a transcendental theory of 
justice to spell that out. Yet we cannot extrapolate from this particular subset of injustices (i.e. 
manifest and clearly remediable cases of injustice) to the entire set of injustices. My belief is 
that the usefulness of transcendental theory is limited and currently enjoys a too high status 
among academic philosophers, but that we are mistaken if we believe that we can entirely do 
without.  
 
Two arguments against the Redundancy Claim 
I will offer two arguments against the Redundancy Claim. The first argument is that many cases 
of injustice are complex and often subtle, and therefore more difficult to identify and analyse as 
cases of injustice than cases of basic injustice. Take the case of gender justice in liberal 
societies, which have seen many decades of feminist activism, and where most citizens 
explicitly support equal rights for men and women. In those societies, many citizens believe 
that gender justice is fully realised. But how do we judge a claim of full or perfect justice? If we 
want to analyse a claim of perfect gender justice, we need transcendental principles of justice. 
We need to specify which conditions have to be met before we consider a certain state of affairs 
as perfectly just. In order to assess such a claim of gender justice, one needs principles that tell 
us when a society is gender just. These principles are transcendental principles of justice (even 
though they are only transcendental in one domain, namely gender relations). Often the most 
effective way to argue for a claim of an injustice that is not blatant, is by arguing for ideals of 
justice, that is, arguing for principles of transcendental justice (in general, or in a particular 
domain), and empirically showing that these principles are not met. Again, social activists make 
ample use of such transcendental principles of justice and of this kind of public reasoning, for 
example when they invoke an ideal of substantive equality of opportunity. Summing up, 
judgments about the comparison of complex cases of injustice implicitly or explicitly do refer to 
ideals of justice. Not just in academic work, but also in real-life public discussions.  
The second argument for the non-redundancy of transcendental theories stems from the 
nature of the non-transcendental theorising of justice, which is the theorising that guides our 
justice-enhancing actions and policies. Non-transcendental theorising of justice entails but is 
not limited to the comparative approach to justice, the approach that Sen champions in The Idea 
of Justice. For example, non-transcendental theorising of justice also includes theorising on 
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how to weigh different principles of justice, or theorising on what to do if in the long run we 
can achieve a more just state, but whereby this requires sacrificing one generation for the sake 
of the following generations.  
I believe that non-transcendental theories of justice require transcendental theories. 
Non- transcendental theories of justice give us a chain of changes that are needed in order to 
reach the most just social state among all feasible social states. We need to have a complete 
‘navigation map’, a clear vision of how to go from where we are to where we want to be. We 
need an entire path of justice-enhancing actions, not only a comparison between two states 
which comparative justice offers us. If we limit ourselves to the comparative approach, we may 
choose for an injustice-reducing action that may benefit us in the short run, but may lead us to a 
suboptimal situation (from the point of view of justice) in the long run, due to the path-
dependency of our actions.  
Suppose that we can represent the degree of justice of a certain situation with a number, 
on a scale where 100 represents the fully just social state. The initial social state A has a justice-
value of 50. From A we can move to either B or S, with B corresponding to a justice value of 
70 and S of 55. If we are in A, and only compare B and S, then the conclusion is easy: we have 
to take action so that we end up in social state B. But our possibilities for further action are not 
independent of this first choice. Suppose that in the best-case scenario we can move from B to 
C, with C having a justice value of 80. From S, however, we will be able to move to T where 
we can realize a justice value of 95. We cannot move from B to T. It then becomes clear that in 
order to make a reasoned decision between B and S, we need to know the ‘paths of change’ that 
B and S are on, and those paths are directing us towards an ideal, that is, a transcendental 
theory. Clearly the comparative approach is an important element of this more complete story 
of how to decide what to do – but that complete story also needs a vision of the ultimate goal, 
that is, a transcendental theory of justice. Thus, I conclude that transcendental theory is in non-
basic cases necessary for justice-enhancing change, and that therefore the Redundancy Claim is 
mistaken. 
 Note that my arguments against the general validity of the Redundancy Claim do not 
require that there is an agreement on the transcendental principles of justice, or that these 
principles are completely spelled out in each and every detail. If there is no agreement, then 
each disagreeing party will need its own transcendental principles in order to make up their own 
minds about which injustice-reducing actions to defend. Similarly, completeness is not required 
for transcendental theories to be useful; in fact, many transcendental principles of justice are 
plural and often somewhat vague and thus require further interpretation before they can be put 
into practice. But even if a transcendental account of justice is incomplete, or even if it consists 
of a plurality of principles which need to be weighted by public reasoning or by intuition, it 
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does give us a set of standards or ideals against which to judge different possible paths of social 
change. The ‘navigation maps’ which we require to guide reasoned choice of policies, strategies 
and institutions for questions of non-blatant injustices must include a specification of our 
ultimate goal, that is, transcendental principles of justice.  
 
Vindicating the Rebalancing Claim 
So far I have advanced two arguments for why I believe that the Redundancy Claim is not 
correct. Yet suppose the redundancy claim were correct: what would have been its 
implications? A weak implication would be that theorists of justice devote too much attention 
and energy to transcendental theory, since it is neither necessary nor sufficient for our ultimate 
goal, which is to reduce injustices. Still, transcendental theory would play some other useful 
role, and we therefore shouldn’t abolish it entirely. Rather, we should restore the balance 
between the attention we devote to transcendental theory and non-transcendental theory. A 
stronger implication would be that theorists of justice should stop conducting all transcendental 
theorising, since it does not contribute anything towards that goal or any other valuable goal. I 
don’t think Sen would endorse the strong implication, given how important he judges John 
Rawls’s theory of justice to be, which Sen believes to be a transcendental theory. I read Sen’s 
work, both in The Idea of Justice and other work, as supporting the weak implication. 
Sen’s concern is that theories of justice should ultimately be ‘practical’. Sen describes 
the aim of the theory of justice as “to clarify how we can proceed to address questions of 
enhancing justice and removing injustice, rather than to offer resolutions of questions about the 
nature of perfect injustice” (p. ix). Not all philosophers espouse this view: some believe that the 
proper role of political philosophy is not to answer the question what to do, but rather to seek 
the truth, whether or not the truth makes any difference to what we should do.   
Of course, the truth-seeking and the practical need not be mutually exclusive. Indeed, 
the practical approach to justice needs to be based on true knowledge about the world and about 
justice, since otherwise the guidance that the philosopher harvests from her reasoning may be 
misleading. Yet we don’t necessarily need to know the full truth, and all possible details of the 
truth: at some point the added value to practice of further truth-seeking knowledge becomes 
infinitesimally small, and may therefore not be the best use of our scarce time.   
There is a growing feeling among some political philosophers that we have reached that 
point, and that the status incentives in (Anglo-American) academic philosophy departments are 
biased in favour of those seeking further details regarding the truth of justice, even if the added 
practical value has become tiny, and despite the fact that enormous amounts of work need to be 
done in non-transcendental theory.  If we really care about justice, and not merely enjoy the 
intellectual stimulation that political philosophy offers, we should be doing something about it, 
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for example by collaborating with policy scholars in figuring out how to design 
philosophically-sound justice-enhancing policies, or collaborating with critical citizens or social 
activists in thinking about how to effectively analyse cases of gross injustice, including those 
that are caused by the state. Yet that kind of ‘applied’ or ‘interdisciplinary’ work, which is often 
muddy and not elegant at all, doesn’t enjoy high status in Anglo-American political philosophy. 
Are we having our priorities right?  
Sen argues in The Idea of Justice that mainstream theorists of justice have their 
priorities wrong: “Importance must be attached to the starting point, in particular the selection 
of some question to be answered (for example, ‘how would justice be advanced?’), rather than 
others (for example, ‘what would be perfectly just institutions?’). … Given the present 
balance of emphases in contemporary political philosophy, this will require a radical change in 
the formulation of the theory of justice” (9). Let me call the argument that we need to shift the 
nature of contemporary theorizing about justice away from the transcendental truth-seeking, 
towards the practical, and thereby also rearrange and rebalance the status that we allocate to 
different types of philosophical enquiry, the Rebalancing Claim.  
The Rebalancing Claim is a weak implication of the Redundancy Claim, and this may 
perhaps explain Sen’s insistence on the Redundancy Claim. Yet the Rebalancing Claim also 
follows from Sen’s general argument about the present dominant practice of contemporary 
theories of justice. In fact, I believe that many philosophers working on specific cases of 
injustice, such as global justice, gender justice, or environmental justice, reject the Redundancy 
Claim but endorse the Rebalancing Claim. That particular position acknowledges that 
transcendental theory does have a role to play, but that it currently enjoys too much status and 
receives too much attention in academia, and that therefore its role should be much more 
limited than is currently the case. If the Redundancy Claim is mistaken but the Rebalancing 
Claim can be convincingly argued for, then I believe that nothing important is lost, and that the 
claim that is really important is vindicated. 
Yet while I agree with the Rebalancing Claim, I do have one qualification to add. In one 
respect I think Sen is too pessimistic in his characterisation of contemporary theorising about 
justice, since much of the kind of work that he is advocating is already being conducted. For 
example, there is a huge literature on particular aspects of global injustices, ranging from Iris 
Marion Young’s analysis of individual and collective responsibilities for the employment 
conditions of workers in sweatshops, to Leif Weinar’s analysis of why the sale of oil by 
dictators in oil-rich African countries to oil companies in Europe and the US is a severe 
property rights violation of the afflicted African populations.
1
 These are examples of excellent 
pieces of theorizing about concrete cases of injustice. If one looks carefully, and not only in the 
most prestigious journals, there is a huge literature out there that does analyse such cases of 
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injustices, though it may not always attract the spotlights to the same degree as the universal 
theories of Rawls, Nozick, Dworkin, and others. In my reading of the contemporary literature 
on justice and injustices, the problem is not so much that this kind of research is not taking 
place, but rather that among too many philosophers it doesn’t enjoy high status and is not 
considered ‘theorising about justice’ but rather classified as applied ethics or case studies on 
injustices. Such attitude underestimates the importance of this type of analysis. Thus, my 
assessment of the situation differs from Sen’s assessment in so far as I think that the kind of 
work he is advocating does happen; I rather think the problem lies in the limited status and the 
non-canonical position of this work compared to more abstract, universal, general theorising 
about justice.  
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